This paper examines the relationship between economic openness and internal conflict.
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, civil wars have become the dominant form of conflict, making an understanding of their origins extremely significant (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Erikson and Wallensteen 2004) . Although researchers have been studying for some time the causes of civil war from a state level of analysis, it is only recently that they have begun to highlight the link between globalization and internal conflict.
As in the debate about the impact of trade on interstate conflict, the relationship between openness and internal conflict is explained theoretically by the liberal and structural paradigms.
The liberal model highlights the pacifying effects that economic growth and development have on the likelihood of civil war. The structural model, on the other hand, singles out inequality as the basic reason for conflict within society. Most researchers testing the conflicting hypotheses from these models examine the correlation between economic openness and the onset or presence of civil wars. This paper contributes to the debate about globalization and peace in several ways.
Using a new events data set, we examine the impact of trade openness on the overall level of cooperation within a country and on the level of cooperation for political, economic, and military events. We also test the influence of trade openness on a constructed country stability measure and on a more traditional indicator of civil war. In this way, we extend the literature on civil wars by investigating whether openness affects broader measures of internal conflict. In doing so, we are one of only a few papers to account for the reciprocal effect between trade and internal conflict.
The variables and measures are drawn from an events data set covering the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . The events data include not only overt military disputes but also more subtle degrees of political, military, and economic cooperation and conflict. Our goal is to extend the empirical literature by investigating whether the relationship between trade and domestic cooperation varies for lower levels of conflict and different categories of interaction.
The empirical results in this paper reveal that open countries have less internal conflictthey are less likely to have a civil war, have more cooperative internal relationships, and have higher levels of country stability. The negative correlation between openness and internal conflict is similar to what previous researchers have found. We show in this paper, however, that the negative correlation between openness and conflict arises primarily because more internal stability leads to greater openness rather than because higher levels of openness cause greater stability. When we perform instrumental variables regression (two-stage least squares) or fixed effects regressions, trade openness has no significant impact on internal stability in seven of the eight models we estimate. The one exception is that more open countries are significantly less likely to experience the most intense civil wars. Higher levels of internal stability, on the other hand, are consistently estimated to have a significant effect on openness regardless of whether we use ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares, or fixed effects regressions.
Thus, there seems to be strong evidence that greater stability allows countries to open their borders but only weak evidence that more openness leads to better internal relations.
TRADE OPENNESS AND CIVIL WAR
Recent empirical studies have yielded much insight about the effect of trade on military conflict. From an interstate level, papers such as Oneal and Russett (1999) find that increased trade flows reduce the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. Other studies, such as Barbieri (2002) , however, find a positive relationship between trade and conflict.
1 While the effects of trade on militarized interstate disputes have been extensively studied, there is less research on the impact of globalization on internal conflict. Most studies linking the impact of trade on internal conflict focus on the onset or prevalence of civil wars. Due to the use of different data sets and variations in the definitions of economic openness and of what constitutes a civil war, the results of the existing quantitative studies are mixed. Sambanis (2004) combines the results of quantitative studies on greed with evidence from case studies and recommends that researchers come up with better measures for some of the empirical variables used to define the link between economics and civil wars.
To explain the connection between trade and civil wars, most researchers root their explanation in either the liberal or structural paradigm.
Liberal Model
The same logic underlying the relationship between trade and peace on the international level is said to hold when we examine the impact of trade on internal conflict. Open economies have more trading relationships that can be destroyed by a civil war, and thus the opportunity cost of internal conflict is higher. The logic of the liberal paradigm suggests that we should be able to observe greater levels of cooperation within states for countries that have high levels of economic interaction. The major hypothesis is that trade promotes development and development is in turn linked to peace (Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch 2003; Sachs and Warner 1995) . In addition to development, Barbieri and Reuveny (2005) cite a reduction in inequality and state control, and an increase in communication and information flows as conducive to 1 Useful reviews of the literature on the relationship between trade and conflict include the volumes by Mansfield and Pollins (2003) and Schneider, Barbieri and Gleditsch (2003) .
peace. The posited relationship found in the liberal model is supported by the rationality model which argues that fear of economic and social welfare losses from war have a deterrent effect on conflict (Polachek 1980 Fearon and Laitin (2003) , on the other hand, suggest that trade has no effect on the onset of civil wars.
Economic openness improves economic development and this in turn diminishes the motivation behind greed or predation as possible causes of internal wars (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2004) . The greed explanation for civil wars emphasizes the financing opportunities for rebel groups through access to natural resources such as oil, diamonds or drugs. The emphasis in such studies is on the opportunity to form a rebel group rather than political science explanations that highlight grievances as the cause for
rebellions. An implication of the greed literature is that civil wars are more likely to occur in countries that depend heavily on primary commodities exports, since the presence of such resources makes them an attractive target for rebels. Thus, improvement of economic conditions will decrease the incentives for individuals to participate in rebellions, making it difficult for leaders to recruit rebels. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that the opportunity model of civil wars performs better than the grievance model. However, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) provide evidence that grievance issues represented by such variables as democracy and ethnic diversity are significant in explaining the prevalence of civil wars. Furthermore, economic growth through trade is likely to provide the governments of such countries with enough strength to deter or put down rebellions (Fearon and Laitin 2001) . The greed argument also has been extended to explain the duration of civil wars. There seems to be a consensus that access to financing prolongs wars. For example, Fearon (2004) shows that civil wars tend to be long if rebels can obtain their funding from contraband such as opium, diamonds or coca. Thus, trade can reduce conflict by raising the capacity of government and reducing the opportunity costs to act peacefully due to alternative income earning activities (de Soysa 2002).
Structural Model
The structural model argues that trade leads to inequality and conflict. The trigger mechanism for conflict is the increase in inequality that is created through a country's openness to globalization. Marxists and neo-Marxists argue that development can increase conflict in society through a variety of means, including exploitation, class conflict, and economic crises (Boswell and Dixon 1993) . Muller and Seligson (1987) provide strong support for the link between income inequality and political violence. The rate of economic growth in countries can also be associated with greater conflict due to feelings of relative deprivation on the part of some groups or classes, since economic growth is not evenly distributed. This is particularly true for countries that depend on the export of commodities. Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) show that countries that export primary commodities benefit less from economic openness. One general implication of this literature is that we can expect to see greater conflict in the developing world since inequality has been increasing for these countries. Reuveny and Li (2003) show that trade openness reduces income inequality, particularly for LDCs; however, FDI inflows increase the level of income inequality.
Other studies have found no relationship between inequality and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2001) .
Effects of Civil Wars on Trade
Estimates of the effect of openness on internal conflict are complicated by the results from many studies showing that civil wars affect external trade flows. At a basic level, civil wars increase the costs and risks associated with trading due to domestic insecurity and disruptions of trade routes (Collier 1999; Stewart, Huang and Wang 2001; Blomberg and Hess 2002) . Civil wars also tend to negatively influence short-run growth within countries and in surrounding neighbors (Murdoch and Sandler 2002) . Furthermore, civil wars are likely to drive away foreign direct investments and encourage capital flight for the same reasons. Collier (1999) argues that civil wars damage investment as well as future economic growth and that the pace of economic recovery is greater after long civil wars rather than short civil wars. In one study, civil wars decreased bilateral trade by one-third (Bayer and Rupert 2004) . The decrease in growth and income is also true for political violence short of war (Sambanis 2004) . In a comprehensive model, Blomberg and Hess (2002) show that internal conflict, external conflict, and the economy are linked. Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) find that severe civil wars reduce trade by about 25% in the first year of conflict and the destruction of trade persists so that trade remains 40% lower than normal even 25 years after the start of the conflict.
While the vast majority of studies focus on bloody civil wars as a measure of internal conflict, some recent scholars such as Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
The main hypothesis we examine is that a country's economic openness affects its internal stability. The liberal model suggests that a more open economy may lead to more rapid economic growth and a higher level of development, which can pacify relations within the country. Higher levels of development are also associated with greater democracy, which can reduce military conflict by allowing adversarial groups in society to contend with each other in the political arena rather than on the battlefield. Furthermore, since conflict threatens the gains from trade, there is a higher cost of conflict in more open countries. Thus, we expect the logic underlying a decrease in civil wars to also apply to a reduction in overall internal conflict short of civil war.
If globalization leads to greater inequality, on the other hand, as the structural model suggests, it could raise internal conflict. The structural model identifies several reasons why globalization may promote inequality, including uneven distribution of economic gains, exploitation, class conflict, and economic crises. The effect of openness on internal conflict also depends on how quickly a country changes its level of integration. Bussman and Schneider (2007) show that global economic integration should reduce civil wars but that the process of liberalization can increase the prospects for domestic violence.
Equation (1) provides the basic empirical model we estimate in the paper.
(
The control variables in equation (1) include the level of economic development and growth in a country, the type of government, the population and population density, the fraction of population in prison, and ethnic fractionalization among the citizens. We also add continent dummy variables to measure differences in internal conflict across regions and year dummy variables to control for changes in worldwide conflict over time. A lagged conflict variable is included to account for the likelihood that conflict in one time period may persist and result in higher conflict in future years. dataset, and it ranges from -10 for autocracies to 10 for pure democracies. Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) hypothesize that civil wars are unlikely under pure authoritarian regimes, which can effectively suppress opposition, and under democracies, where opposition can be expressed through the political system. Internal conflict is likely to be highest in regimes that lie between the two extreme cases. Thus, we rescale the polity variable so that it runs from 0 to 20 and include both the polity and polity squared as explanatory variables in estimating equation (1).
Most previous studies examining the link between openness and conflict define conflict as the presence or onset of a civil war. The Correlates of War data on intra-state conflict and Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset provide two sources of data on civil wars, and each of these data sets includes indicators of the intensity of the conflict as measured by the number of battle deaths. In one set of regressions, we present results using a dummy variable that equals one if a country is defined as having any civil war in year t with at least 25 battle-related deaths in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. We also present regression results using the cutoff of 1000 battle-related deaths to count as a civil war. The last variable is referred to by Barbieri and Reuveny (2005) as the presence of a civil war or civil war prevalence, as opposed to civil war onset which would be coded as one only in the first year of the war. We refer to a civil war with at least 1000 deaths as an intense civil war. Since the civil war variables are dichotomous, we estimate equation (1) using a probit model when a civil war is the measure of internal conflict.
There are many levels of disputes that fall short of military conflicts, however, and the armed conflict data sets miss these lower-level disputes. In order to examine lower levels and types of conflict other than purely military battles, we also provide measures of conflict using an events data set from 1990 to 2004 based on machine-coded readings of Reuters news reports. King and Lowe (2003) compared the computer program used to read the news reports with human coders and found that both methods were equally accurate ways of coding the news reports. Each event has a source and target country identified and is given one of 157 possible Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) codes. Bond, et. al. (2003) describe the IDEA framework. King and Lowe (2003) provide a mapping from IDEA codes to the conflictcooperation scale described in Goldstein (1992) , in which negative values represent acts of conflict and positive values indicate cooperation. In order to focus on internal conflict or cooperation within a country, we restrict our data set to include only events in which both the source and target country are the same.
The data set contains 9,507,513 events that are internal to a country during the period 1990 -2004. One measure of the cooperation level within a country in year t is the average Goldstein conflict-cooperation score over all the events: Goldstein is the conflictcooperation score for each event from Goldstein (1992) . These scores range from -10 for military engagements to 8.3 for extending military aid, and thus the average score for a country will be negative if its internal actions are primarily conflictual and it will be positive if its actions are mostly cooperative. While the average Goldstein score is limited to being within a certain range, none of the observations included in the regressions lie on the boundary, and thus we can use a linear regression when this score is our measure of internal conflict.
There are many advantages to the events data. They provide greater flexibility in measuring conflict and a more accurate indication of lower level disputes. The events data also allow researchers to examine political or economic disputes within a country as well as military conflict. One concern with using machine-coded events data is that a single event may be reported several times in news reports and thus it may show up as more than one event in the data set. To ensure that our results are not being driven by repeated news stories, we have re-run each of the estimates below after excluding any event observations that might be a result of repeat news reports (observations with variable values identical to an event occurring in the previous seven days). The results we report below were unchanged when these potentially repeat news reports were excluded.
A second concern in using events data is that many more news reports are issued about some countries than about others, which may affect the event data conflict measures. As a robustness check on our later results, we have included in the conflict equation a variable measuring the number of newspapers per capita in the country's population. This news variable has no significant effect on the average Goldstein conflict-cooperation measure from equation (2), and including the news variable does not change any of the results we describe below.
A second measure of internal conflict is a variable designed to quantify country stability.
This variable is a modified version of a country's conflict-carrying capacity, which Jenkins and Bond (2001, 4) define as "the ability of the state to regulate intense internal conflict without loss of system integrity." The idea is that countries are unstable if both the government and the civil sector participate in contentious actions and if force is often used rather than merely being threatened. Contentious actions are defined as those in which an actor threatens, demonstrates, sanctions, expels, seizes, or uses force against another. force is the number of events in which force is used, and violence is the number of events in which force is used, threatened, or mobilized, or an ultimatum is issued. The country stability variable ranges from zero to one with higher numbers indicating greater internal stability for the country. While no countries have a value of zero for country stability, nearly 10 percent of countries have the maximum possible value of one. In estimating regressions using country stability as our measure of internal conflict, then, we use a Tobit model specifying an upper limit of one on the dependent variable.
Estimating equation (1) alone provides an indication of how openness and conflict are correlated with each other after controlling for each of the other explanatory variables.
Unfortunately, we can not interpret the coefficient on openness as measuring the effect of openness on conflict. First, internal conflict within a country is likely to reduce international trade flows and thus reduce the measure of openness. The governments in countries that have had less internal conflict may also have found it easier to open their borders. In addition, there are likely to be omitted variables that are correlated with both openness and internal conflict in a country. Governments that have good policies in areas other than trade may also tend to have more open economic policies. In both cases, the problem is that the openness variable is correlated with the error term (i.e. it is endogenous). If so, we can observe a positive correlation between openness and internal cooperation even if openness has no impact on cooperation.
There are two ways to solve the problem of omitted variables or endogeneity. The first is to include country fixed effects. If the unobserved variables affecting conflict are constant over the period of our sample (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , then country fixed effects will capture the impact of the time-invariant omitted factors on conflict.
A second solution is to use instrumental variables regression (two-stage least squares in a linear model). First we specify a model determining a country's openness.
The control variables affecting a country's openness include its GDP, population, population density, government type, distance from other economies, and level of infrastructure. Equation (4) also includes time and continent dummy variables as well as lagged measures of the country's openness.
In a two-stage least squares regression, openness is first regressed on all of the exogenous variables in equations (1) and (4), and then the predicted value from this regression is used in estimating equation (1). To identify the effect of openness on conflict, it is necessary to include variables in equation (4) that are excluded from equation (1). These are the instrumental variables that affect the ratio of trade to GDP (openness) but do not directly influence the cooperation or conflict within a country. The instruments we use for openness measure a country's trade infrastructure and how close geographically it is to the other major economies in the world. There are four infrastructure variables that affect the cost of transporting goods within the country: the navigable waterways per land area, railways per land area, highways per land area, and airports per land area. The other instrumental variable quantifies the country's remoteness, which is a weighted average of the country's distance from potential trading partners, where the weight assigned to each trading partner is that country's GDP as a share of world GDP. None of the five instrumental variables has a statistically significant impact on conflict if they are included in equation (1). Equation (4) can also be estimated to determine the impact of internal conflict on a country's level of openness but it will suffer the same problem as equation (1) in that conflict is likely to be endogenous. Again, however, we can solve this problem by including country fixed effects or by using instrumental variables regression, where the instruments are the variables that affect conflict but do not directly affect openness. The instruments we use for conflict are the country's prison population per 1,000 citizens, ethnic fractionalization, and the growth rate of GDP per capita. Table 1 shows the impact of a country's openness on internal conflict and cooperation.
RESULTS
The level of conflict or cooperation within a country in columns 1 and 2 is measured using events data. In the first column, the dependent variable is the average Goldstein score for all events occurring within the country in each year. The dependent variable in the second column is the country stability measure from Bond, Bond, Jenkins, and Taylor (2001) . In the third and fourth columns, the dependent variable equals one if the country was in a civil war in which there were at least 25 battle-related deaths (column 3) or 1000 battle-related deaths (column 4) in the year. Each of the explanatory variables is lagged by one year to prevent civil conflict in the current year from affecting the explanatory variables in the regression. We also include a lagged dependent variable in each of the regressions to account for the fact that conflict can persist over multiple years so that past levels of conflict influence current levels.
The top half of the table treats the level of openness as an exogenous variable while the bottom half presents instrumental variable regression results for the four models. The top half of Table 1 shows that countries with greater openness tend to have lower levels of internal conflict.
More open countries have significantly higher average Goldstein scores among all internal events, greater country stability, and a smaller chance of having a civil war during the year. A one standard deviation increase in the log of openness variable raises the average Goldstein score by 0.05 standard deviations. The final two columns show that openness is estimated to significantly reduce the probability that a country is involved in a civil war during the year.
The conclusions change, however, when we use two-stage least squares or instrumental variables to estimate the impact of openness on internal conflict. The bottom half of the table shows that the coefficient on openness dramatically drops in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant in the first three regressions once we treat openness as endogenous. Treating openness as endogenous reveals that openness reduces the likelihood that a country will have an intense civil war but it does not significantly affect broader measures of stability or lower levels of conflict within a country. These results are similar to those in Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) , who find that openness reduces the likelihood of intense civil wars but may actually increase the probability of lower levels of internal conflict.
The last row in the table presents a test of whether it is appropriate to treat openness as exogenous. The null hypothesis is that the variable is exogenous, so a rejection of it provides significant evidence that instrumental variables should be used. Here the evidence is mixed.
When country stability is the dependent variable, the hypothesis that trade is exogenous is rejected at the 10% significance level. For the other columns, however, the hypothesis that trade is exogenous can not be rejected. If the lagged dependent variable is not included in the model, however, the hypothesis that trade is exogenous is rejected at the 1% level in three of the four regressions.
The first column also presents two tests of the instrumental variables used. The weak identification test presents the Cragg-Donald (1993) Wald statistic. Weak instruments can create a bias in IV estimation, and Stock and Yogo (2002) derive critical values for the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic. In the case of column 1, a Cragg-Donald Wald statistic over 18.37 indicates less than a 5% maximal relative bias in the instrumental variables estimation. Since the weak instrument statistic is over 36, it easily passes the test for weak instruments. The overidentification test presents the Sargan statistic, which tests the assumption that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the cooperation equation (a necessary condition for the instruments to be valid). The Sargan statistic for the model in column 1 is not significant, which means that the model passes the overidentification test.
The estimates in Table 1 suggest that richer countries and those with large prison populations are more stable and have higher average Goldstein internal cooperation scores. The significant negative coefficient on the polity variable and significant positive coefficient on polity squared in the country stability regressions provides some evidence that mixed government types are less stable than pure autocracies or pure democracies, as Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch (2003) argue. In the top half of Table 1 , country stability is minimized at a polity score of slightly less than halfway between pure autocracy and pure democracy. The large and significant positive coefficient on the lagged dependent variable shows that internal conflict is highly persistent over time. Table 2 presents estimates of the effect of openness on internal conflict after controlling for country fixed effects. The fixed effect captures the impact on conflict of any time-invariant variable, so the continent dummy variables and our measure of ethnic fractionalization, which are constant within each country, are dropped from the regression. The estimates in Table 2 confirm the results from the bottom half of Table 1 . Trade does not have a significant impact on any of the measures of internal conflict when omitted variables are controlled for using country fixed effects. The impact of trade on intense civil wars is larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate, however, so its statistical insignificance is caused by the large standard error (a result of the relatively few cases of intense civil wars).
It may be reasonable to find no significant effect of openness on conflict after we have controlled for per-capita income since one common argument is that trade leads to higher incomes, which are associated with less internal conflict. The results in Tables 1 and 2 that openness does not significantly affect internal conflict in the instrumental variables and fixed effects regressions are unchanged, however, if the per-capita income and per-capita income change variables are dropped from the regressions.
The relationship between openness and internal stability may be different in developing and developed countries since the former tend to be less stable and less open. When the models in Tables 1 and 2 are re-estimated using only developing countries (those not in the OECD), the conclusions remain unchanged. Openness significantly raises internal cooperation or stability measured using events data and lowers the chances of a civil war if openness is treated as an exogenous variable in the regression. When instrumental variables or fixed effects regression is used, however, openness has no significant effect on any of the measures of internal conflict in developing countries.
While trade is the variable most commonly used in the existing literature, there are other measures of a country's openness. Table 3 investigates the relationship between openness and internal conflict using foreign direct investment as a share of GDP as the measure of how open an economy is. The results are similar to those in Table 1 . Countries that receive larger shares of foreign direct investment are significantly more stable and have higher average Goldstein scores in the events data set when FDI is treated as exogenous. Unlike the results with trade flows, however, countries with more inward FDI are not significantly less likely to have civil wars (although the coefficients on FDI in the civil war regressions are negative). When instrumental variables estimation is used, however, FDI openness only has a statistically significant impact (at the 10% level) on the probability of an intense civil war occurring. If country fixed effects are included in the regressions, then FDI has no significant impact on any of the internal conflict measures. These results suggest that the relationship between FDI and internal conflict is similar, but perhaps slightly weaker, than the relationship between trade openness and internal conflict. One advantage of the events data is that we can examine the relationship between openness and different types of internal conflict or cooperation. Table 4 The results in Table 4 are consistent with the conclusion from the earlier estimates that openness reduces only the most severe internal conflict (military clashes), but that it has no significant effect on the less severe forms of conflict such as political or economic disputes. Table 5 addresses the question of causality between openness and conflict by estimating the impact of internal stability measures on the country's openness. Once again, each explanatory variable is lagged one year to reduce the problem that the dependent variable may have an impact on the explanatory variables. The top half of the table presents OLS regressions and the bottom half uses instrumental variables to estimate the effect of internal cooperation on openness (the dependent variable is the natural log of openness). The variables used as instruments are the lagged change in the country's GDP per capita, ethnic fractionalization, and prison population per capita. The table includes estimates using four measures of internal stability: the average Goldstein score, Country Stability, and dummy variables indicating whether or not the country is in any civil war or an intense civil war. In the first three columns, the exogeneity test statistic is significant at the 5% level, which means that it is necessary to use two-stage least-squares to estimate the regression.
In three of the four OLS regressions, greater internal stability leads to significantly higher levels of openness (the coefficient on the average Goldstein score barely misses the cutoff for statistical significance -the p-value is 0.107). The instrumental variables estimations generally confirm this result as well: openness is significantly higher in countries with larger average Goldstein cooperation scores, stronger country stability measures, and those without a civil war.
The only case in which internal conflict fails to affect openness significantly in the instrumental variables regressions is when conflict is measured by the presence of an intense civil war. This last result is likely caused by the weakness of the instrumental variables. Intense civil wars occur rarely, and the three instrumental variables do a poor job of predicting their occurrence (the low value for the weak identification test suggests that the instrumental variables estimates suffer from bias due to weak instruments as Stock and Yogo (2002) discuss). The weak instruments also mean that despite the fact that the coefficient on the intense civil war variable is over three times larger in magnitude than in the OLS estimation, it is very imprecisely estimated and is not statistically significant. Table 6 presents estimates of the effect of internal conflict on trade openness using country fixed effects to control for unobserved factors that influence a country's level of openness. As in Table 5 , three of the four regressions find that greater internal conflict significantly reduces a country's openness to international trade. The estimated effect of a civil war on openness in Table 6 is not statistically significant but is negative and very close in magnitude to the coefficient on the civil war variable in the OLS regression in Table 5 .
In all three types of regressions (OLS, instrumental variables, and fixed effects), the point estimates reveal that more intense civil wars are associated with a larger reduction in the country's openness than are the less severe civil wars. The OLS estimates indicate that civil wars with at least 25 battle-related deaths reduce external trade as a share of the economy by about 2.4% while civil wars with at least 1000 deaths reduce openness by 4%. The instrumental variables estimates suggest a much larger effect: any civil war is estimated to reduce openness by 24% while intense civil wars reduce it by 61%. The fixed effects estimates are close to the OLS estimates, with any civil war reducing openness by 2.1% and intense civil wars reducing openness by 6%. Tables 5 and 6 with those in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that the impact of internal conflict on trade is more consistent and robust than the impact of trade openness on conflict. Except for the case of intense civil wars, a significant effect of openness on conflict is found only in the OLS regressions in Tables 1 and 2 . When instrumental variables or fixed effects regressions are estimated, openness is generally found to have no significant impact on internal conflict. The estimated impact of internal conflict on trade, on the other hand, is largely robust to the estimation method with significant coefficients on the conflict variable found in three out of four of the regressions for each type of estimation: OLS, instrumental variables, and fixed effects.
Comparing the results in
Another way of showing the relationship between openness and internal conflict is found in Figures 1 and 2 , which examine how changes in country stability are related to the decision by countries to liberalize their economies. The liberalization variable comes from Wacziarg and Welch (2003) , who have updated the Sachs and Warner (1995) data set on dates of country liberalization. A closed economy is defined as having at least one of the following characteristics: an average tariff rate of 40% or more, nontariff barriers covering 40% or more of imports, a black market exchange rate at least 20% lower than the official rate, a state monopoly on major exports, or a socialist economic system. The Wacziarg and Welch liberalization dates If opening up to trade has short-run costs but long-term gains for the country in terms of stability, as Bussman and Schneider (2007) argue, then we should observe a U-shaped curve as country stability initially declines and then rises following liberalization. Figure 1 shows that countries that liberalized their economies experienced a rise in stability over the first ten years after liberalization. There follows a dip in country stability between years 10 to 17 and then a continued increase in stability through the 28 th year after liberalization. After that date, country stability remains fairly constant. Thus, the gains from liberalization appear to be quite longlasting.
Interestingly, the countries' stability measures begin rising about 9 years prior to its liberalization date. This result could be explained in two ways. One is that countries liberalize their economies gradually over time, and it takes nearly a decade on average for liberalizing countries to reach the threshold set by Sachs and Warner to be counted as an open economy.
The liberalization dates may thus be marking a point in the middle of a process of opening up the country. If the move toward openness leads to greater country stability (which is supported only partially by the evidence in Tables 1-4) , then we would see a pattern of country stability rising before and after the official liberalization date, as in Figure 1 .
A second explanation is that countries may need some level of internal stability before they are capable of liberalizing their economies. In that case, countries that are successful in opening up their economies will have experienced, on average, a rise in their stability in the years preceding the liberalization. Thus, other factors which lead to a rise in stability could allow the liberalization to take place. This explanation would be consistent with the result in Tables 5 and 6 that more stable countries are more open. Figure 2 shows the results of a nonparametric regression of the civil war dummy variable on openness, and the conclusion are similar to those from Figure 1 . The probability of a civil war is estimated to drop beginning about a decade before the liberalization date until about the eighth year after liberalization. For the next 10 years, the probability of a civil war is estimated to rise, after which the likelihood of having a civil war declines sharply. Thus, in both figures 1 and 2 there is some evidence that the process of liberalization is a destabilizing force, as Bussman and Schneider (2007) argue, but instability caused by liberalization does not materialize instantly.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the relationship between openness and different levels and types of internal conflict. We find consistent empirical evidence that instability within a country reduces the international trade share of its economy. This result emerges both when we treat internal conflict as exogenous and when we control for endogeneity using instrumental variables or fixed effect regressions.
The impact of openness on internal conflict, on the other hand, depends on whether openness is treated as an exogenous variable and on how the internal conflict is measured. If we assume that openness is exogenous, as previous researchers have done, we find that openness is associated with reduced levels of internal conflict by nearly any measure. When we use instrumental variables or fixed effect regressions to control for endogeneity, we find no significant impacts of openness on the probability that a country has a small civil war or on other measures of internal stability. These conclusions do not emerge because of the specific variables we use as instruments for openness since we get the same results using a variety of instrumental variables and in fixed effect regressions. Examining different types of internal stability, we find no significant impacts of openness on internal conflict over political, economic, or military issues in instrumental variables regression.
Estimating the impact of openness on large-scale civil wars provides a different conclusion. In both ordinary least squares and instrumental variable regression, we find that openness significantly decreases the probability that a country will have an intense civil war.
The estimates thus support the liberal model's prediction that more open societies are less likely to engage in the most severe form of military conflict.
One possible explanation is that openness has both positive effects and negative effects on internal disputes. An increase in trade is likely to raise political and economic issues that will bring different groups into conflict, as the radical or structural paradigm predicts. Since instability can destroy trading relationships, on the other hand, more open economies have a higher opportunity cost of internal conflict, and thus greater openness may also have a pacifying effect as the liberal paradigm argues. If these contradictory impacts largely offset one another, it seems plausible that openness could have only a small overall impact on low-level conflict.
Only in the most severe cases of internal conflict does the pacifying effect of openness dominate.
The different results that emerge depending on how civil wars are defined and what type of conflict is examined suggest that researchers should not limit their research agenda to only one definition of internal conflict.
While openness is associated with fewer intense civil wars, we present evidence that the process of economic liberalization can be destabilizing. Investigating countries' liberalization histories reveals that there is an increase in a country's internal stability for the first ten years after liberalization but then a decrease until the 17 th year, when stability again begins to rise over time. The estimates also show that countries' internal stability begins to rise nine years before the country liberalizes. This result is consistent with the idea that countries usually achieve some degree of stability before they open themselves to the global market. Year dummy variables and a constant are included but not reported *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels Year dummy variables and a constant are included but not reported *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels Year dummy variables and a constant are included but not reported *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels Year and continent dummy variables are included but not reported *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels Years since liberalization Probability of a civil war
